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Child care support programs for double income families 
in Korea 
Kim Jeong-hee 
Introduction 
The birth rate in Korea in 2005 was 1.08 children per woman, 
the lowest in the world. This is a clear indication of the 
prevailing trend in Korea of ‘a family without a child’, and 
mirrors the burdens and difficulties of child care. It is 
particularly applicable to women in the paid workforce with 
children: since the gendered division of labour remains solid, 
these women face double responsibilities, at work and home. 
In March 2005, 52.3 per cent of the working population of 
Korea were full time employees working under contract for a 
period of over one year; 33.3 per cent were temporary workers 
who were hired for periods between one month and one year; 
and 13.4 per cent were daily workers, reflecting overall low levels 
of job security (KNSO, 2005). Despite the low levels of job 
security, the increased burden of bringing up children is forcing 
a growing number of Korean households to become double 
income families.  
This chapter reviews the status of child care arrangements in 
Korea and the difficulties faced by women in the paid workforce 
with children. It also puts forward suggestions as to how to 
address some of these difficulties. Government policies at the 
national level that support child care for double income families 
are comprehensive in nature and are also linked to tax 
exemption, education and other policies.  
Although it is acknowledged that bringing up children requires 
broad social and national support, this chapter focuses 
specifically on maternity leave, parental leave, childcare services 
and family participation in child care. It is based on an analysis 
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of literature concerning women in the paid workforce and their 
use of and access to child care in Korea; in particular, it draws 
on the national survey on child care conducted by Seo Mun-hee 
et al (2005) through the sponsorship of the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Families and further material from related 
ministries on women’s issues (Seo Mun-hee et al, 2005).  
Maternity leave and parental leave  
Since liberation from Japanese rule in 1945 and up until 
recently, maternity leave was the equivalent of 60 days of unpaid 
leave. ‘Protection of motherhood’ was the most important issue 
for the women’s movement in Korea in the 1990s and, as a 
result, three national government bills relating to motherhood 
protection passed in July 2001. Ninety days paid maternity leave 
became the standard in November 2001. The costs associated 
with the additional 30 days were funded through employment 
insurance and the national budget. 
As shown in Table 7.1 (below), the percentage of working 
women who had a child and were given paid maternity leave was 
25.1 in 2003 and 31.2 in 2004. In other words, only two to three 
out of ten women in the paid workforce who gave birth received 
paid maternity leave.  
Since November 2001, when the Motherhood Protection  
Laws were revised in Korea, any male or female worker with  
a child under one year of age could take paid parental leave  
and was entitled to receive W200,000 (equivalent of US $200) 
per month for 10.5 months in addition to 90 days paid  
maternity leave. From 2003, the monthly allowance for parental 
leave was increased to W400,000 (US $400) but still fell  
short of the minimum monthly wage of W567,260.  
Table 7.1 (following) shows that only an estimated 25.1 per cent 
of all women workers in 2003 and 31.2 per cent in 2004 took 
maternity leave after they gave birth. Such a low rate can be 
attributed to the fact that maternity leave was granted only to 
employment insurance beneficiaries. 
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Table 7.1. Statistics of maternity & parental leave of women 
workers (2003, 2004) unit: persons, % 
 Numbers 2003 2004 
 Newborns (a) 493,471 476,052 
 Women workers who gave birth (estimates)(b)*  127,809 123,297 
Women workers who took maternity leave(c)  32,133 38,541 
Women workers who took the parental leave (d)  6816 9303 
Rate of maternity leave among women workers(c/b x 100)  25.1 31.2 
Rate of parental leave among women workers (c/d x 100)  5.3  7.5 
Source: Korea National Statistical Office, 2003. (2004a) 
(* b= (a)x 25.9(%))1 
 
As at the end of 2004, more that 9.5 million women were 
economically active. However, the number of women insured 
was only 1.5 million, or 16 per cent of the economically active 
female population (Ministry of Labour, 2004; KNSO, 2004c). As 
stated above, maternity leave is granted only to employment  
                                                     
1 According to Hwang Su-kyong’s analysis of the 5th Korea Labour Panel 
(2002) survey data, 54.5% of married women, from newly married to before 
first childbirth, hold jobs. But during the peak of their child care period, 
which is usually after the first childbirth until the youngest child becomes 
two years old, only 25.9% of women held jobs (2004: 111–12). 4411 women 
were selected for the sample analysis. Supposing the sample analysis 
represents a general picture, 25.9% is believed to be the rate of women 
working after they gave birth.    
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insurance beneficiaries, and 61.3 per cent of women workers as 
of December 2005 were temporary workers with employment 
contracts for less than one year (KNSO, 2005). Therefore, the 
institutionalisation of maternity leave has little impact on the 
lives of most working mothers. 
Table 7.1 also shows that 5.3 per cent of women in the paid 
workforce in 2003 and 7.5 per cent in 2004 were assumed to 
have taken parental leave, which is much lower than the take up 
of maternity leave. The first possible reason for this is that 
parental leave, like maternity leave, is granted only to 
employment insurance beneficiaries. The second reason is that 
resignation due to childbirth is still dominant in Korea’s 
entrepreneurial culture. As explained by the woman in the 
example quoted below, as long as parental leave is not made 
compulsory as it is for national defence commitments, it is 
unlikely to be practised effectively: 
I am working for a finance company that has relatively 
good welfare programs, however, thus far only one 
person has taken parental leave. Everyone said she was 
very bold. Not to mention how unprecedented it was 
to take paid leave, everyone wonders if she would be 
allowed to come back to work after the one-year leave. 
I am pregnant. I should be happy about it but 
concerns outweigh the joy, when it is not certain if my 
desk would still be there even after the 90 day 
maternity leave. How can I be audacious enough to 
think about one year’s paid parental leave? Unless the 
leave is made compulsory like the duty for national 
defence and liability to tax, no one could take the 
leave with any peace of mind. (Ministry of Labour, 
homepage, id ‘moron’) (“I am scared that I would 
hear ‘why don’t you take the parental leave?” 
hani.co.kr 6 Oct 2002) 
According to the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family,  
39.4 per cent of Korean women gave up their jobs after  
marriage and 12.6 per cent of them said they quit because of 
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disadvantages at work over pregnancy and childbirth (Seo  
Mun-hee et al, 2005: 92–93). 
In 2004 the parental leave rate increased by only two per  
cent over the previous year (Table 7.1). Accordingly, in 2005,  
the government sought various means to make parental leave  
for child care a viable option. Proposals included: relaxing the 
requirement for subsidy payment for replacement personnel 
and increasing the unit price of the subsidy for parental leave; 
implementing guidance and supervision of the parental leave 
system for child care; in the case of civil servants, increasing the 
parental leave period from the current three years to five years, 
(while at the same time raising the eligible child age from three 
years to five for mothers to apply for parental leave); and 
initiating active programs to encourage paternal leave (Joint 
Response by related Ministries and Organisations, 2005). 
However, positive results cannot be expected if these proposals 
are not supported by concrete measures. 
In order for the proposal to relax requirements for subsidy 
payments for replacement personnel and to increase the unit 
price of the subsidy for parental leave to work effectively, the 
employer has to be able to replace the worker on leave at more 
or less an equal level of productivity (in terms of skills and 
professional qualities). When such conditions are met, the 
prospective mother can take parental leave without having to 
worry that her absence would create an extra burden for her co-
workers. In March 2005, the Civil Service Commission, a 
government agency, established a new allowance system for 
paying 30,000-50,000 won per month to co-workers who take on 
extra work for those who take parental leave (Collecting 
opinions on running a bank for replacement manpower, 2005). 
It is highly questionable whether such an allowance, which 
amounts only to one or two per cent of the monthly salary  
of the employee taking leave, could effectively replace that  
employee. Similar problems exist with the 200,000 won the 
government pays to private companies for the leave subsidy and 
100,000–150,000 won as a replacement subsidy. 
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As for the guidance and supervision plans to implement the 
parental leave system and the publicity plans for paternity leave, 
one could expect positive effects if they are implemented in 
parallel with subsidy programs that guarantee to meet real costs 
of living. If the cost of living condition is met, then the guidance 
and supervision and publicity programs would contribute to 
creating a child care-friendly culture in companies. It would also 
give assurance to workers that when they are ready to return to 
work, their job will still be there. 
Further, in order to overcome the limitations of maternity and 
parental leave, of which the benefits are limited to those 
receiving employment insurance, a family allowance system 
should be introduced. Family allowance should apply to every 
child, and the payment level should be realistic enough to 
actually alleviate the cost burden of child care. Ways to support 
direct and indirect costs for women who choose to stay at home 
to raise children should also be considered (Lee Jae-gyeong et 
al, 2005). Finland, for example, began building family support 
systems in 1948, including the introduction of a child allowance 
system. Child allowance alone reached four per cent of GDP by 
the 1950s in Finland, and the figure has been increasing 
continuously since then (Park Hyon-sok, 2005). 
Strong regulations at both national and international levels  
are also required in order to bring about changes to the  
practice of forcing women to quit jobs after childbirth. A  
female workers quota system, or the introduction of tax 
disincentives for enterprises with low maternity leave rates, could 
be part of a set of national measures. International regulations 
could also be considered, including regulations banning 
resignation due to childbirth in international agreements such 
as the International Standard of Corporate Social Responsibility  
 
(ISCSR). The International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO) is planning to finalise a draft of the International 
Standard of Corporate Social Responsibility to come into force 
by 2008. While international agreements are not binding, non-
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adherence to them would place an employer organisation at a 
disadvantage in the international context. Women activists 
should therefore be forming international alliances to take 
advantage of such agreements.  
Problems with childcare services 
A survey conducted by the Ministry of Gender Equality and 
Families found a clear set of priorities regarding childcare 
support policies for preschool children. Support for such 
initiatives emerged in the following order of priority: subsidies 
(44.7 per cent), diversity of services (18.2 per cent), expansion 
of public day care centres (17.8 per cent), enforcement and 
expansion of parental leave (8.7 per cent), better qualified 
teachers (5.9 per cent), better quality service (3.5 per cent), and 
improved childcare information (1.1 per cent) (Seo Mun-hee et 
al, 2005: 387). 
As of 2005, only 42.8 per cent of working mothers, 20.1 per cent 
of unemployed mothers, and 37 per cent of single fathers (or 
families without a mother) sent their children to day care 
centres, as reflected in Table 7.2 (below). Further, 40.9 per cent 
of working mothers sent their children to other educational 
institutions. Alternately, 44.5 per cent of working mothers’ 
children were placed in the care of blood relatives, 4.7 per cent 
in the care of parents-in-law, and 27.6 per cent received private 
tutoring. It was also found that there is a general practice for the 
parents of children in day care centres to make use of other 
services as well. 
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Table 7.2. Status of child care1 (unit: %, persons) 
Note 1:  figures represent duplicate answers.  
(Source: Seo Mun-hee et al (2005) (simplified of the Table 3-3-17) p 117) 
In summary, problems with childcare services in Korea are to do 
with the lack of availability of places, the level of program quality 
of day care centres, and the affordability of childcare fees.  
Availability of places at day care centres  
In Korea working hours are long, and so for parents the distance 
between their home and a childcare facility presents another 
obstacle to child care. This issue emerged in parents’ responses 
to a survey question that asked: “What is the most important 
reason for choosing a childcare/child education facility?” In the 
Division Infants and kids 
 Working 
mothers 
Non-
working 
mothers 
Children 
without 
mother 
Organisations/childcare givers 71.1 48.9 77.4 
Day care centres 42.8 20.1 37.0 
Other childcare service 
organisation (kindergarten, church 
kindergarten, half day institute, 
other institutes, study room, and 
others) 
40.9 31.6 52.6 
Relatives by blood(residing/non-
residing grandparents or relatives) 44.5 6.9 79.6 
Relatives–in-law (baby sitters, 
neighbourhood baby sitters, part-
time house keepers) 
4.7 0.2 3.7 
Private tutoring (home visit 
tutoring, group tutoring, daily  
tutor paper) 
27.6 31.2 11.3 
 (984) (1917)  (53) 
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case of day care centres, 25.6 per cent nominated the distance 
between home and the facility as the most important reason; in 
the case of preschools, this was the most important reason for 
18.1 per cent of respondents.  
Most pre-school programs provide transport, so the 
distance can take a backseat to educational programs. 
In the case of day care centres, it is the parents who 
need to take the children to the facility so the distance 
is more important to the working parents who have to 
go to work after dropping the children at the facility. 
(Seo Mun-hee et al, 2005: 152).  
About half the Korean population lives in apartment buildings, 
and almost every large apartment complex has an ‘elderly 
pavilion’ (a facility for the elderly) next to the children’s 
playground; however, there are only a few day care centres for 
children in the apartment complexes. Every morning, in energy-
scarce Korea, children are shuffled in a van from one 
neighbourhood to another. Nationwide, the number of day care 
centres within apartment complexes makes up around 2.8 per 
cent of the total 670 centres (Joint Response by related 
Ministries and Organisations, 2005: 31–32). In 2005 the 
government reviewed the possibility for making childcare 
facilities2 mandatory in large apartment complexes, however, the 
realisation of such a policy is still an open question. 
A further problem is that there are insufficient caring hours 
available at existing centres thus affecting availability of 
appropriate places. Koreans work longer hours compared with 
other countries in the world. In 2004, for example, the average 
annual working hours per person in employment was 1357 
hours in the Netherlands, 1363 in Norway, 1585 in Sweden, 1669 
in the UK, 1808 in the US and 1816 in Australia. In Korea, it was 
2394 hours, making it the highest amongst OECD member 
                                                     
2 Child care facilities include day care centres, pre-schools and other 
facilities for child care. 
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countries (OECD, 2006: 265). Working mothers were the subject 
of a Ministry of Gender Equality and Families survey in 2004 
which found that they were working an average 8.4 hours a day 
(standard deviation 2.5 hours), 48.4 hours a week (standard 
deviation 18.2 hours) (Seo Mun-hee et al, 2005: 444). Taking the 
standard deviation into consideration, this equates to 5.9 to 10.9 
hours a day, and 36.2 to 60.6 hours a week. This implies that 
there are working mothers who work longer than 10 hours a day. 
Considering the daily commuting time, approximately one hour 
each way, a 12- to 13-hour a day nursery care service is required 
for double income families. 
Table 7.3 (below) clearly shows the need for night time 
childcare services. A study done by Kim Jeong-hee and others 
(2004) found that mothers working as nurses, railway station 
workers, factory workers, journalists, social welfare specialists, 
bankers, public servants and others, need extra care service 
beyond that of regular day nurseries (whose standard hours are 
7:30 am to 7:30 pm) at least twice a week, either so that they can 
work overtime or for other job-related activities. The breakdown 
of the survey data on additional needs was as follows: extra hours 
service, 27.9 per cent; 24-hour care, 25.8 per cent; and night-
time care, 18.4 per cent. 
Table 7.3. Night care needs for preschool children  (unit: %, 
persons) 
(Source: Seo Mun-hee et al, 2005. (Simplified of the Additional-Table 4-75) p 482).  
 
division yes No. total No. of children
구분 always 1–2 times a week 
 1–2 times a 
month 
1–2 times 
a year 58.7 100.0 (2962) 
  10.1~14.0 11.8~13.2 10.6~17.7 2.3~4.0 58.7 100.0 ( 358) 
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There is a risk, however, that further availability of night-time 
child care in day care centres, will reinforce the culture of long 
working hours for both parents, which in turn would further 
decrease the potential birth rate if fathers’ participation in child 
care is not increased. While the immediate need for night time 
care in day care centres should not be ignored, it is more 
desirable to have fathers’ participation in child care increased 
and overall working hours reduced.  
Program quality and affordability in day care centres  
The shortage of day care centres does not appear to be the only 
reason why only 42.8 per cent of working mothers (as shown in 
Table 7.2) send their children to day care centres. It appears 
also to relate to the lack of quality services at the centres. Survey 
results indicate that 36 per cent of working mothers either do 
not want to send their children to day care centres or were 
undecided. Of non-working mothers, 23 per cent stated that 
they would prefer to have a job but felt there was no service to 
which they could entrust their children (Seo Mun-he et al, 2005: 
230, 295).  
High quality care and education are composed of various 
aspects, however, in Korea, the teacher is considered as most 
important. According to Lee Mihwa et al (2005: 110), 25.7 per 
cent of nursery school teachers were paid under 790,000 won 
(US$790) monthly; 27.7 per cent were paid 800,000–999,000 
won; 22.7 per cent were paid 1-1.19 million won; 17.1 per cent 
were paid 1.2–1.39 million won; and 6.8 per cent were paid more 
than 1.4 million won. Compared to the average monthly wage of 
Korean workers, which is 1.750,421 won, nursery school teaching 
is a low paying job (Ministry of Labour, 2005). Such poor 
working conditions are directly linked to very limited work 
experience in the field. In 2004, teachers with less than one 
year’s work experience accounted for the highest percentage 
(32.2 per cent) of those employed in the field; those with 1–2 
years’ experience made up 21.6 per cent; and those with 2–3 
years’ experience, 18.4 per cent. Therefore, teachers with less 
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than three years’ experience constituted 72.2 per cent of 
working nursery teachers (Lee Mihwa et al, 2005: 108). This 
highlights the fact that due to poor conditions it is unlikely that 
childcare workers will be highly trained professionals with long-
term work experience. 
In Korean society, teaching at a day care centre is considered a 
‘3D’ (difficult, dirty, dangerous) occupation with low wages and 
poor working conditions. Day care centre teachers are mostly 
high school graduates who have completed only a one-year 
course at ‘nursing teacher’ training centres, rather than a four-
year college education majoring in early childhood development 
or kindergarten education, a further factor in the lack of quality 
care or education in child care. 
Despite dissatisfaction with the quality of child care, there has 
been no policy response from the government apart from the 
introduction in 2005 of a childcare facilities certification 
program. The government’s intention in introducing this system 
was to induce childcare facilities to provide high quality services. 
However, no specific compensation plans were made for 
certified childcare facilities. More recently, a discussion has 
begun on developing a standard childcare procedure. This 
standard procedure, which is still in the development stage at 
the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, distinguishes six 
areas of development and life activities for children: social 
relations, communication, physical development, artistic 
experience, and exploration of natural science (Kim Jeong-won 
& Kim Il-ok, 2005). A key concern of bio-feminism (the Korean 
version of eco-feminism) is that children should grow up healthy 
in body and mind (Kim Jeong-hee, 1998, 2005a,b,c). From this 
perspective, it is of great concern that current standard 
procedures do not specify outdoor play, which is essential for 
children’s physical development.  
According to research conducted outside Korea on outdoor 
play, children who grew up playing outdoors developed faster 
physically, were able to concentrate better, and were less 
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frequently sick; also, their play was more diverse, imaginary and 
creative (Moore, 2000, cited in Lee Boo-mi, 2001: 86). In studies 
conducted in Korea, it was also revealed that children who 
engage in outdoor activities almost everyday were more sociable 
than children in childcare who did not have such programs 
(Woo Namhee & Koo Hyuna, 2000). 
Outdoor activity is viewed as an integrated sphere in which all six 
areas of development listed in the standard childcare procedure 
can take place. As shown in Table 7.4 (below), many day care 
centres in Korea do not have an adequate number of teachers 
and assistants, often limiting the capacity for children to have 
outdoor activities. However, there are around 300 childcare 
facilities that are part of Children’s Houses for Cooperative 
Childcare or the Eco-Infant Cooperative, both of which have 
major programs that include outdoor field trips, walks, and 
growing vegetables, in contrast to all other childcare facilities, 
where such outdoor activities do not take place. 
Day care centres in private homes or shopping malls that are 
licensed have fewer than 20 children, but do not necessarily have 
a garden. In larger facilities, the situation is not much different 
because there is no law stipulating that there have to be outdoor 
play areas. Consequently a child may stay inside all day, and in 
some cases into the night too, giving rise to a serious policy issue 
about the quality of child care. The standard childcare 
procedures currently under development should clearly specify 
the percentage of outdoor activities that should be compulsory 
or should specifically nominate compulsory outdoor activities. If 
outdoor activities are included as a daily requirement, the 
teacher-child ratio must be reduced, which means the number 
of teachers in day care centres must be increased. 
Table 7.4 (following) shows child-teacher ratios in the three 
types of cooperative day care centres where high quality 
education takes place. These centres are part of a work-based 
consortium with extensive support from companies and from 
existing day care centres.  
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Table 7.4. Child vs. Teacher ratio 
Age (month) Existing day 
care centre 
Cooperative 
childcare 
Consortium type day 
care centre at work 
Paedology
(age x 3)
1~12   1:3  1: 2~3  1:3  1: 2~3 
12~24   1:5  1: 3  1:4  1: 3~6 
24~36   1:7  1: 5~7  1:6  1: 6~9 
36~48   1:15  1: 7~10  1:11  1: 9~12 
48~60   1:20  1: 10~13  1:14  1: 12~15 
After school    
hours    1:20  1: 13     
(Sources: Ministry of Gender Equality & Families (2004), Cooperative childcare and 
Communitarian Education (2000), Statistics about the consortium type at work are 
from telephone interviews.) 
Low quality services in day care centres, as discussed above, 
encourage parents to turn to additional educational institutions. 
Stay-at-home mothers collect their children from day care 
centres at around 2 to 3 pm and send them to other educational 
institutions. Children of working mothers also leave day 
nurseries before closing hour and go to other institutions. For 
example, 46.5 per cent of children of working mothers and 30.1 
per cent of children of non-working mothers attend more than 
two nursery/educational services (Seo Mun-hee et al, 2005: 101). 
Stay-at-home mothers certainly have more time to look after 
children’s study by themselves than working mothers, which 
drives the latter to have their children engaged in more 
educational programs. 
Considering that Korea is a highly educated society where almost 
half the high school graduates enter college (45.4 per cent in 
2004), a key policy consideration should be to improve the 
educational skill of nursery teachers. Investment in retraining 
teachers and in increasing their numbers is required. This in 
turn requires an increase in the government’s childcare support 
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budget. As mentioned in the above Ministry of Gender Equality 
and Family research, childcare costs would need to increase by 
2.5 to 3.5 times to improve the quality of childcare (Park Gi-baek 
et al, 2005). 
Increased costs would place pressure on parents. In 2004, 
average monthly nursery and education expenses for preschool 
children were W235,000 (US$235), with the lowest being W3000 
(US$3) and the highest W1,440,000 (US$1440). Average 
monthly nursery and education expenses for one child were 
W172,580 (US$173) (the expenses includes that for children 
who received a fee waiver or discount), and for two children, 
twice the amount, at W344,840 (US$345.) Average monthly 
nursery and education expenses for children in the care of in-
law relatives was W445,200 (US$445), with a standard deviation 
of W250,500 (US$250) (Seo Mun-hee et al, 2005: 118, 121, 313). 
Among additional expenses for extra education programs, 
childcare subsidies (44.7 per cent) takes the highest priority, 
followed by diversity of available programs (18.2%), by those 
surveyed (Seo Mun-hee et al, 2005: 387). 
As a percentage of GDP, child care/child education costs per 
child in 2001 in Korea were low at $US1913 compared to the 
OECD average of US$41871. The percentage of GDP for 
providing support to childcare/child education facilities for 
children over three years of age was 0.1 per cent in Korea 
compared to the OECD average of 0.4 per cent (OECD, 2004a, 
b). If the absence of family allowances in Korea is also taken into 
account, the gap becomes even bigger. In European countries 
that have successfully avoided low birth rates, the family 
allowance alone is 1.5 per cent (Grant J et al, 2004, cited by Lee 
Jae-gyeong, 2004). However, in Korea, despite the government’s 
recognising the low birth rate as a national strategic crisis and 
despite its major policy initiative to combat this low reproductive 
rate, the total budget for the government’s ‘comprehensive 
measure to combat low birth rate’ for 2005 and 2006 came to a 
mere 0.2 per cent of GDP (Table 7.6). This is only seven to 13 
per cent of what European governments pay in family allowances 
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alone. By 2009, Korean families will receive up to 130 per cent of 
the average urban working class income in childcare subsidies, 
and 80 per cent of all children in Korea will receive government 
subsidies for their care. However, the budget ratio in terms of 
GDP is unlikely to change. In comparison to 2006, the total 
budget will have only doubled to 4.662 trillion (Joint Response 
by related Ministries and Organisations, 2005). If, in the process, 
the childcare fee structure is deregulated in order to normalise 
the quality of childcare services, and if the parents’ share of the 
costs increases, it may render government efforts to combat the 
low birth rate meaningless.  
Table 7.5 National government budget for combating low birth 
rate in GDP percentage  (unit : a hundred million won, %) 
 Total budget for 
combating low birth 
rate (a) 
Forecasted 
GDP 
(KDI)(b) 
The GDP rate of total 
budget for combating low 
birth rate (a/b x 100) 
2005 16,912 831,3788 0.20 
2006 23,351 898,7205 0.26 
(Source: Joint Response by related Ministries and Organisations (2005), KDI(2005), 
Hyundai Economic Research Institute (2005). 
 
Family participation in child care  
In a survey on low birthrate, conducted amongst 1054 married 
and unmarried young people (male 467, female 587), 3.2  
out of every 10 adults aged between 20 and 40 said that  
women avoid childbirth because ‘childbirth and child care all 
fall on women’, and 2.7 said that ‘no help is available for  
child care’ (Reasons why we do not bear children, 
http://www.womennews.co.kr/news/view.asp?num=26288). Also, 
out of 9303 people who took parental leave in 2005, only 181 
were male workers (Ministry of Labour, 2005). Furthermore, 
women in paid work continue to have similar responsibilities for 
housekeeping as non-working women: average housekeeping 
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per day for women is three hours and 18 minutes, while for men 
it is 26 minutes (KNSO, 2004b). This demonstrates that female 
workers cannot expect much from their husbands when it comes 
to sharing the housework. Thus, for full-time female workers, 
the total daily work hours on average, including housework, is 
12–13 hours. Women find it very hard to cope with such a heavy 
‘double’ workload, as is clear from the following statements:  
“It was physically very challenging, which led to severe 
depression.” 
“Having no personal life, it feels like three years had 
passed when it’s only been three months.”  
“With my first child, I had a difficult time with my 
mother (who was taking care of it) and the baby was ill 
all the time. I really wanted to quit my job, wondered 
what on earth I was doing...”  
“Being a reporter is practically impossible. To spend 
more time with kids, I’m thinking of moving to a job 
with regular working hours”  
(Kim Jeong-hee et al, 2004: 73–74)  
 
Table 7.2 (above) showed that 44.5 per cent of working mothers 
received help from blood relatives and 4.7 per cent from non-
related people. Women who received support from their own 
mothers or mothers-in-law expressed guilt about being a bad 
daughter by burdening their parents with the care of their own 
children (Kim Jeong-hee et al, 2004: 69-79). For the older 
generation of carers, the situation is also unsatisfactory. It seems 
to me that older people do not take comfort in taking care of 
their grandchildren. Given the conflicts that arise, child care by 
relatives is often not a desirable alternative. 
In 2006, the Korea Youth Corps (KYC), whose members are 
workers, housewives and college students mainly in their 20s and 
30s, held a press conference asking for the introduction of a 
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‘Papa Quota’, under which fathers would be automatically given 
a certain period of leave for child care, and declared they would 
wage a ‘baby strike’ until the end of the year (to reclaim fatherly 
lover, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/labor/153919.html). 
The press conference is testimony to evolved, younger 
generations in Korea who are willing to share the  
responsibility of child-rearing. It is government policies that are 
lagging behind. 
Programs such as ‘Daddy Month’ in Sweden and ‘Papa Quota’  
in Norway pay fathers to take paternity leave. Those fathers  
who developed a primary bonding relationship with their  
child by helping their wives immediately after childbirth 
continued to participate voluntarily in child care activities (Kim, 
Mihwa, 1990). Feminist psychologists observe that parentally 
gender-segregated child care tends to regenerate gender 
stereotype: girls to have relation oriented ego and boys more 
individual and atoministic or chauvinistic ego, which reinforces 
patriarchy (Chodorow, 1978; Dinnerstein, 1989.) If it is urgent 
to combat the low birth rate in Korea, it is also necessary to 
introduce paternity leave options similar to those in Sweden and 
Norway as soon as possible. Compulsory paternity leave may have 
a revolutionary effect by transforming men who say that they 
agree with participating in child care in principle but who do 
not practise what they believe. 
The need for ‘night nursing’ should be reviewed as a key 
cultural transformation. Night nursing is the extension of child 
care beyond normal office hours, for example between 7 and  
10 pm, for parents who work late. Night nursing facilities in 
Korea have increased from 600 in 2004 to 2000 in 2005, and the 
government plans to continue to increase this number. However 
if the government continues to support funding night-time 
childcare without changing the long-working hour culture, no 
changes will occur in the labour system or in fathers’ 
participation in child care. It is possible, even with current long 
working hours, to decrease the demand for night-time child care 
if couples cooperate with each other and take turns in working 
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night hours, or if Korean society supports the development of 
such a culture.  
The need for night nursing comes from the fact that mothers 
cannot expect fathers to take responsibility for feeding infants at 
night, and they also cannot expect any social support for such 
sentiments. The absence of campaigns to encourage fathers to 
leave work on time will further turn Korea into a work- and 
male-centred society, and women who are only now beginning to 
express their desires for social achievements, which had been 
denied to them before, will continue to avoid childbirth and 
child care.  
Lastly, it may be worth reviewing the possibility of operating and 
co-locating childcare facilities with older people’s day care 
centres (known as ‘elderly pavilions’). However, at the individual 
household level, relying on older grandparents for child care,  
as discussed above, is not very promising as a sustainable child 
care plan. 
Conclusion 
Female workers with children are ‘sandwiched’ between their 
children’s and their elderly parents’ generations. Their effort to 
balance child care and education with their job is almost as if 
they are in a constant battle field. This chapter has attempted, 
through analysing a wide range of data, to demonstrate what the 
reality is for such women. We have argued that women’s 
perception of child care as a burden, and education has led to 
unprecedented low birth rates in Korea. The government has 
only recently recognised that child care is a core national 
priority and that social reproduction requires economic 
investment. However, the child care and child education ‘war’ in 
Korea cannot be solved by economic investment alone 
(particularly given that the size of such investment in Korea is far 
below that of European countries, which are also fighting to 
counter low birth rates). The importance of changing the 
patriarchal culture, which is integral to the phenomenon of low 
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birth rates, has not been given due consideration in government 
policy. Fathers’ parental leave and a system for fathers to leave 
work on time are two practices that must become mandatory up 
to a certain point if the government is genuinely seeking to 
promote a successful birth-friendly and family-friendly work 
culture. Otherwise, policies will remain ideological slogans 
rather than practical solutions. 
The government must make efforts to introduce and stabilise a 
culture of gender-inclusive child care, where both mothers and 
fathers are actively involved, rather than allow the culture of 
gender-segregated child care to continue; otherwise the attitudes 
of young women workers, and men who agree with them, will 
not change. It is young Korean working women, who are fertile, 
who consider traditional family values to be anachronistic. Many 
such women have resolved that success or failure in life comes 
from their work outside the home. Government policy should 
make bi-parental child-rearing a basic practice. Equally 
important are single-parent households, remarriage households, 
and grandparent-grandchildren households. Government 
policies should consider these households as equally important 
when they develop any policy on child care. Government 
policies must also include programs for introducing  
gender-equal and multi-cultural child care. Also required are 
family allowances that could supplement the limitations of the 
current childbirth leave system, a realistic personnel 
replacement system, and the improvement of child care quality 
from an ecological perspective. 
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8 
Health, economic, and policy implications of an ageing 
Australia.   
Hal Kendig and Ruth Phillips 
Introduction 
Lifespan, generational relationships, and the context of social 
change are key issues for policy on ageing in Australia. This 
chapter will examine how ageing has been addressed as a social 
policy issue in Australia as well as exploring, to some extent, how 
older people are constructed as a group for research and policy 
development in Australian society. First, the specific 
characteristics of the Australian context will be discussed. 
Second, key areas of ageing policy will be examined, including 
costs and economic futures, health and care futures. Third, 
some issues concerning attitudes towards ageing and ageing 
policy in Australia will be raised. 
Australia in context 
Australia is a comparatively stable society and population ageing 
has been relatively moderate, with the most notable change 
being the recent rapid increase in the number of people in 
Australia of 80 years of age and over (Kendig, 2000: 107–111). 
For example, the number of Australians over 85 years of age 
increased by 114 per cent over the past two decades, from under 
one per cent in 1984 to 1.5 per cent in 2004 (ABS, 2006d). As 
noted by McDonald in Chapter 2 in this book, the rate of 
population ageing in Australia will increase. This shift in 
Australia’s demography has resulted in a growth in both social 
policy responses and services development. However, many of 
Australia’s ageing policies are bound up in conflict and tensions 
between the national Commonwealth government and the 
various state governments over the implementation of policies. 
Negotiations between the Commonwealth and State 
